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dOrganisational ecology  and growth of firms in developing  countries




The bimodal  size structure  of manufacturing  firms  in African  countries  is found to result from  a
complex  process  in  which  institutional  and  structural  factors  interact  with  a  dynamic  learning
growth  process  of firms.  Using  a unique  data  set  on the  growth  of firms  in  the  manufacturing
sector of CMte  d'Ivoire,  firm growth  is explained  by size  and age effects  as a result of efficiency
seeking through scale enlargements  and learning, but is strongly moderated by processes  of diffuse
competition through which firms compete for resources and by formal legitimation  in the industry.
These  processes  appear to  substitute  for the  lack of well  developed  markets.  Complementing  the
model with data on the obstacles  to growth as they are perceived by the managers or owners of the
firms,  medium  sized  firms  are  found  to  be  'caught  in  the  middle'  and  are  strongly  hurt  by
insufficient  access to good infrastructural  and financial services.
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In  many  African  countries,  even  in  countries  with  a  comparatively  large  manufacturing
sector,  the size structure of firms is highly dualistic.  The largest share of industrial  output
is produced  in  large-scale  modem  establishments  with  a more  advanced  capital  intensive
technology,  which  is  mostly  imported  and  import-dependent.  On  the  other  hand,  most
employment  in  manufacturing  takes  place  in  the  informal  sector  which  provides  basic
manufactured  goods  for  local  customers  using  very  simple  labour-intensive  techniques.
Despite the dynamism  of micro-enterprises  and small firms  to survive  and to operate  in  a
very  competitive  environment,  they  have  insufficiently  evolved  into  more  productive
formal  activity firms  and have  seldomly  graduated  into  larger-scale  operations.  African
entrepreneurship  remains  extremely  weak  in  medium  and  large-scale  modem  industry.
This  feature  of  the  African  industrial  sector  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  'missing
middle'  in the size distribution  of firms (Biggs and Oppenheim,  1996).  It deviates from the
observed size distributions of firms in Western economies.
This paper focuses  on the industrial  structure  and  growth  of manufacturing  firms  in  Cote
d'Ivoire.  C6te d'Ivoire is  an interesting country for the study of enterprise  development.  It
has  by  African  standards  a  relatively  well  developed  industrial  sector,  accounting  for
approximately 20%  of GDP over the period 1980-93 (World Bank,  1994, p.62).  It can also
be considered  as  a good representative  country for the region as it shares its past economic
achievements  and  its  current  structural  problems  with  a  large  number  of  Sub  Saharan
African  countries.  In  the  first  decades  after  independence  the  economic  and  industrial
development  of  the  country  was  impressive.  The  country  entered  a  period  of  severe
economic  crisis by the end of the  1970s and  was  one of the first countries  to implement
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)  as early as  1981.
The  country's  manufacturing  sector  was  shaped  in  the  early  post-independence  period,
when  the development  of a solid and modern  industrial base  was expected  to come  from
large-scale  investments  by  the  state  and  foreign  investors.  The  large-scale  enterprises
generated disappointing  results and in the beginning of the 1980s the focus of attention  was
shifted towards smaller scale enterprises  as the engine of growth.  The SAPs implemented
since  then  aimed  at  macro-economic  stabilisation  and  'restoring  market  forces',
channelling  resources  into  more  productive  sectors  and  removing  the  discriminatory
measures  which hamper the development  of small  firms.  Whether the SAPs succeeded  in
realising  their  objectives  is  at  least  doubtful.  After  more  than  10  years  structural
adjustment the industrial  structure  is  still  described  as being  characterised  by 'a "missing
middle"  of dynamic  small-  and medium-scale firms'  (World Bank,  1994,  p.5).  Data from
the  'Banque  de  Donn6es  Financieres'3 show  that  there  is  indeed  a  relative
overrepresentation  of firms in the largest and in the smallest size categories.
3 All firms  in  the  manufacturing  sector  that  follow the  French  accounting  system are  required  to  file  their
balance  sheets  with  the  Banque  de Donn6es  Financieres  (BDF).  Coverage  of the  manufacturing  sector  is
extensive but  not complete,  especially  for the  smaller  firm categories.  Despite  these deficiencies  the BDF
represents  the most complete  list of formally registered  establishments.  As firms submit  their balance  sheets
with  an  average  delay  of  four  years  the  data  of  1987  were  used  to  describe  the  size  distribution  of
manufacturing  firms.  Data on production  in  1987  were  available  for 522  manufacturing  firms.  A Shapiro-
Wilk  test  was  done  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  the  size  of firms  is  log-normally  distributed.  The  null-
hypothesis  could be rejected at the 95%  confidence  level  as firms in the largest  and smallest  size  categoriesIn  spite of its  achievements,  C6te d'Ivoire  can  still be characterised  as an  economy where
markets  are relatively underdeveloped  and transaction  costs extremely high.  The existing
theories on firm growth do not sufficiently take these features into account. The purpose of
this paper is to provide  a more comprehensive  integrated approach and to test this approach
against data on the growth  of firms in the manufacturing  sector of the country.  This new
framework may also help to shed additional light on recent empirical findings with respect
to the growth of small  firms in  southern African  countries (McPherson,  1996) and in India
(Das  1995).
The  paper  is organised  as  follows.  The  second  section  reviews  the  existing  literature  on
firm size and growth with respect to its relevance in developing countries. The third section
introduces  elements  from  the  organisational  ecology  literature  and  shows  how  they  can
complement the existing literature  on firm  size and growth  in a context of less developed
market institutions. Section four presents an integrated approach  which serves as  a basis for
empirical testing. After presenting the  data in section five the empirical model is proposed
in  section  six  and  tested  against  data  on  manufacturing  firms  in  Cote  d'Ivoire.
Corroborating  insights  on the  obstacles  to  firm  development  are  derived from  analysing
the owner's  and manager's perception in section seven.  Section eight concludes.
2.  The growth of firms
Research  on the  size  distributions  of firms  and  the underlying  firm  dynamics  commonly
starts  from Gibrat's law  of proportionate  effect  (LPE).  According  to this  law  firms  grow
each  year  following  a  random  drawing  from  a  distribution  of  growth  rates.  As  a
consequence  the  expected  value  of  the  increment  of  a  firm's  size  in  each  period  is
proportional  to  the current  size  of the firm.  This  stochastic  growth  model  as  well  as the
whole  generation  of growth  models  based  on  weaker  assumptions  of the  LPE  generate
skewed distributions  (log-normal, Pareto, Yule)  which fit the observed size distributions of
firms  in Western  economies  strikingly well  (Ijiri,  Simon,  1964).  In  spite  of the apparent
power of Gibrat's law, an increasing number of empirical  studies find evidence which goes
against  it.  Most  studies find  a significant  negative  relationship  between  firm growth  and
firm size  (Mansfield  (1962), Evans (1987a), Kumar (1985)  and Dunne and Hughes  (1994))
and between  the variability in growth rates and firm size [Mansfield  (1962), Kumar (1985),
Dunne and Hughes  (1994), Dunne,  Roberts and Samuelson (1989)].  Similarly Gibrat's law
is violated by a negative relationship between firm growth and firm age  [Evans (1987a)  and
Dunne and Hughes (1994)] and between the variability  in growth and firm age.
Using  an  alternative  theoretical  approach  Lucas  (1978)  argued  that  the  equilibrium  size
distribution  of firms  is  determined  by  the underlying  distribution  of managerial  abilities
within  the population.  Deepening  this line  of reasoning,  Jovanovic  (1982)  claimed  that,
once firms are established in the industry, they learn about their efficiency.  The process  of
were  relatively  overrepresented.  Taking into  account  that smaller  firms  were less completely  represented,  it
can be assumed that the actual  bimodal shape is even more pronounced.competition  forces the least efficient  firms to exit.  The more efficient  firms expand their
activities when their managers observe  that their guesses  about their managerial  efficiency
turn  out  to  have  understated  their  true  efficiency.  As  a firm  ages,  the  manager's  guess
about  his  efficiency becomes  more  accurate  and the  probability decreases  that  the output
will widely  differ from one year to another.  Older firms therefore grow more slowly than
young  firms  and  their  growth  rates  are  relatively  stable.  Pakes  and  Ericson  (1990)
extended  the  passive  learning  model  of Jovanovic.  In  their  view  managers  not  only
uncover  their (fixed) level of efficiency  through learning, they are also able to increase this
level of efficiency over time through human capital formation.
Unfortunately,  neither  the  stochastic  models  nor the  recently  developed  learning  models
which  violate  the  LPE,  provide  a  sufficient  explanation  for  the  emergence  of the  dual
market structure observed  in many LDCs.  If smaller firms are found to grow  significantly
faster than larger firms, a bimodal shape disappears automatically as  successful  small firms
move up to the middle of the size distribution.  Models of learning assume that competition
among  firms  in  an  industry  selects  the more  efficient  firms  into  the  industry  and  forces
inefficient firms to exit.  However, competition  fails to operate  as a selection mechanism if
a too  low number of market participants  and the existence of transaction  costs hamper the
well  functioning  of markets.  This  appears  to  happen  in  many African  economies  where
factor markets  are ill-developed  and some groups of firms face  serious  constraints in their
access to  inputs such  as  credit,  skilled labour, utilities,  business  licenses,  support services
etc.
Institutional  economists  have drawn  attention  to the importance  of institutional  influences,
the degree of development  of markets and the existence of transaction  costs for explaining
market  structure  in developing  countries.  Nabli  and Nugent  (1989)  argue  that due  to  the
existence  of transaction  and  information  costs  the  actual  size  distribution  of firms  can
deviate  from  the  'natural'  distribution  which  would emerge  from  exogenous  factors  like
technology,  market  size,  transport  costs.  Under  extreme  conditions  the  'transaction  cost
considerations  might  be  such  as  to  lead  some  otherwise  average-sized  establishments  to
become  large  and  others  to  become  small,  leading  to  the  frequently  observed  dualistic
structure  characterised  by  a  bimodal  distribution'.  The  argument  is  mainly  developed
around  the effect of the  relative underdevelopment  of markets  for credit and equity on the
size  of firms  (Nabli, Nugent,  1992,  see  also Nugent  (1996)  for  an empirical  testing  with
respect to Korea).
The basic idea of institutional economics  should  therefore  be extended  and generalised  in
the  context  of  firm  development,  centering  on  the  following  question:  If markets  are
underdeveloped  and competition  as a selection mechanism is deficient,  which processes  are
operating  instead  to  select  firms  and  to  allow  them  to  grow.  In  order  to  address  this
question  it  appears  useful  to borrow  some  core  insights  from the  organisational  ecology
literature.  Organisational  ecology  typically  puts  heavy  weight  on  the  institutional
environment  in  explaining  observed  populations  of  organisations  (Boone  and  van
Witteloostuijn,  1994).  The importance  of organisational  ecology is explicitly recognised in
the  work  of  Klepper  and  Graddy  (1990)  and  especially  appropriate  in  the  context  of
developing countries.3.  Ecological  and evolutionary models  with institutional constraints
Organisational  ecology (OE)  is primarily  inspired by analogies  from biological population
ecology.  One  of the purposes  of the  organisational  ecology  literature  is to  explain  why
there are  so many different  kinds  of organisations.  Like biological  diversity,  the diversity
of organisations  is explained by selection within a Darwinian perspective.  Organisations  of
different  kinds  exist  because  the  environment  allows  certain  forms  of  organisations  to
exist.  A  changing  environment  selects  new  forms  of organisations,  and  changes  in  the
population of organisations  are mainly  due to the founding and mortality  of organisations.
Due to the existence of relative inertia  in organisations,  OE recognises  that there are limits
to the speed and scope of adjustment of organisations  to changes in the environment.  This
is in  contrast  to  much  of the  traditional  management  strategy  literature  which  states  that
firms continuously  fine-tune their structure  and strategy to a changing environment.  While
adaptation  of organisations  is central  to management  literature,  selection (entry and exit)  is
the  key to change  in an organisational  population  according to the  OE literature.  Another
distinction  between  both  strands  in  literature  is  that  the  prime  level  of  analysis  is  the
individual  organisation  in 10 literature  while the focus  is on a population of organisations
in OE (Boone, van Witteloostuijn,  1994).
The (development of the)  number of firms depends on several  factors.  In the OE view the
niche in which the population  resides is crucial.  Thefundamental niche of a population  of
organisations  consists  of  the  set  of  all  environmental  (social,  economic,  political)
conditions  in  which  the  population  can  grow  or  at  least  sustain  its  numbers.  If  two
organisational  populations  rely on completely  different  kinds  of resources  and depend  on
different kinds of social and political institutions, their fundamental niches do not intersect.
Intersection  in  fundamental  niches  might  be  thought  of  as  potential  competition.  Two
populations  compete  if  and  only  if their  fundamental  niches  intersect.  Competition  is
centred  around  resources,  as  opposed  to  the  traditional  concept  of  competition  in  the
product market.
When  two  or  more  populations  with  intersecting  fundamental  niches  occupy  the  same
system,  the expansion  of one  population  changes  the  conditions  of the  other's existence.
The term  realised niche is  therefore  used  to  refer to the  restricted environmental  space  in
which  a population  can  sustain itself  in the presence  of competing  populations  (Hannan,
Carroll,  1992).  Within  a  population  all  organisations  compete  for  the  same  set  of
resources,  a  process  called  'diffuse  competition'.  The  growth  of  any  one  organisation
impedes  the growth of others (Hannan, Ranger-Moore,  Banaszak-Holl,  1990).
The  niche  concept  shows  some  similarities  to  the  strategic  group  concept  described  in
management  literature.  Niches  can  be  described  following  several  dimensions,  mostly
location  and size  (Debackere,  Clarysse,  1997).  Some organisational  ecologists  have used
the  spatial  dimension  to  identify  niches,  indicating  that  location  matters  with  respect  to
founding  and  mortality rates.  Another  theoretical  explanation  focuses  on different  niches
based  on  size  of  firms.  Organisations  compete  most  heavily  with  organisations  of  a
comparable  size  (Hannan,  Ranger-Moore,  Banaszak-Holl,  1990).  Organisations  of
different  sizes,  although  they  are  engaged  in  similar  activities,  use  different  strategies,
structures and resources  and serve different  clients.  This also implies that organisations  in
the middle  of the size distribution  compete  most intensely  as  they  compete  for resources
both with large and small organisations  (Boone, van Witteloostuijn,  1994).An  important  feature of a niche  is its carrying  capacity,  that is,  its  maximum  size  or the
maximum  number  of organisations  that  can  sustain  itself in  that  niche.  The  degree  to
which the carrying capacity of the niche is filled is called  'density'.  Density is measured by
the number of organisations in the niche.  Density is determined by two forces:  competition
and legitimation.  Intense competition  within a population  depresses founding rates in that
niche.  As  the level  of competition  increases,  more  of the  resources  needed  to build  and
sustain  organisations  have  already  been  claimed  by  other  organisations.  Intense
competition  causes  supplies  of  resources  to  become  exhausted.  Fewer  resources  go
unclaimed  and  markets  are  packed  tightly.  In  tightly  packed  niches,  new  entrants  are
pushed to the  margins  of the  resource  distribution.  Even  if they  succeed  in  successfully
exploiting the inferior regions of the resource  space, in the course of doing so they commit
themselves in persisting  at the  margins.  Learning of the  staff, the experience  of the entire
organisation,  and  the  connections  of the  organisation  with  the  environment  all  become
specialised  to  exploiting  the  inferior  regions  of  the  environment.  Attempting  to  shift
towards  the  centre of the resource  space  will bring  the organisation  into competition  with
others  experienced  in exploiting  the centre.  Marginal  organisations  will therefore  have
higher than average mortality rates (Hannan, Carroll,  1992).
Density  moreover  varies  systematically  with  legitimation  or  institutionalisation.
Legitimation  is  primarily  a  sociological  concept.  Legitimation  refers  to  the  social
acceptance  of  an  organisational  form.  An  organisational  form  is  institutionalised  or
legitimated to the extent that it has a taken-for-granted  character,  which provides it with  an
institutional  standing  in  the  eyes  of the  law  enforcing  agencies,  consumers,  suppliers,
police,  and other key  actors.  A form receives  legitimation  to the extent  that  its  structure
and  routines  follow  the  dictates  of  the  prevailing  institutional  rules.  Legitimation  is
stronger  than  competition  at  very  low  densities  (Hannan,  Carroll,  1992).  This  is  in
economic terms, in new or thin markets.
Despite the fact that the concepts  of competition  and legitimation  are developed  to explain
density variations  through entry and exits  of organisations,  much of their meaning remains
relevant  in  the  context  of firm  growth.  The  process  of competition  for  inputs  and  the
importance of the process of legimitation in thin markets  can be extended to the theory of
firm growth.  The focus  here is however  on the  individual  firm and on its  interaction  with
the environment.  Organisational  change,  growth  or contraction,  is  viewed  as  determined
by environmental conditions.  This view is shared with the evolutionary  theory which,  in a
more  adaptive  approach,  state  that  the  entrepreneur  engages  in  innovation  or  imitation
when the environment  in which the firm operates,  its boundaries, culture, know  how, rules
and incentives structure, make the performance  of the firm unacceptable.
4.  Towards an integrated approach
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  market  selection  processes  and  associated  growth  theories
developed  within a  dynamic  learning  context  (Jovanovic,1982,  Pakes and  Ericson,  1990)
are also  at work in developing  countries.  However,  the speed and efficiency  at which they
work  appears  to be  moderated  through  the  particular,  less  developed,  institutional  andeconomic  context  in  which  firms  have  to  operate.  The  absence  of  well  developed
institutions,  including factor  and services  markets,  may  therefore  render  legitimation  and
diffuse  competition,  from  the  population  ecology  perspective,  important  moderators  in
explaining growth performance  of firms.  Clearly, the moderating effects are likely to differ
across regions,  sectors,  and even  segments  within  industries.  For some  industrial  sectors
markets  and regulations  may be better developed.  Because  of an underdeveloped  transport
and  communication  infrastructure,  the  difference  in  institutional  and economic  context  is
also likely to be great across different regions of the same country.
If efficient  supporting  institutions  are  ill  developed,  information  asymmetries  arise  and
privileged  relationships  emerge  following  the  logic  of  the  legitimation  process.  The
incorporation  of  legitimation  as  a  growth  determining  factor  appears  particularly
appropriate  to the  analysis of firm growth  in developing  countries.  The most  frequently
mentioned  institutional  barriers  to  the  growth  of firms  in  developing  countries  are  the
relative  underdevelopment  of markets  for  credit,  equity  capital,  management  and  skilled
labour,  the  lack  of  access  to  industrial  sites  with  suitable  infrastructural  facilities,
regulatory  constraints,  the  various  kinds  of taxes,  price  regimes,  risk,  protection  from
imports  and  state subsidies,  the lack of physical  inputs,  materials  and  spare parts  and  so
forth.  In a developing country,  especially in Sub-Sahara Africa,  the process of legitimation
has therefore  been  very  important.  After  independence  a new  'modem'  industrial  sector
was created by the state and foreign investors,  which was  superimposed  to the 'traditional'
domestic and private small scale activities.  This new form of organisations  was politically
stimulated,  and  most  of the  resources  were  channelled  into  this  group  of organisations.
Belonging  to this  group  required  that the  organisation  had  a formal  status,  fulfilling  all
legal  regulations  on activities,  labour  and location  as  well  as  all  fiscal obligations  which
characterised  the  new  modem  economy  and  distinguished  the  firm  from  the  traditional
activities.  This  formal  status  granted  the  firm  legitimation  in  the  new  business
environment  and  gave  it  the  possibility  to  advertise  itself  and  to  develop  privileged
relationships with suppliers, clients and other parties.
Confronted  with  the process of legitimation  and diffuse competition,  newly created  firms
may  adopt  different  technologies  or  serve  particular  market  segments,  giving  rise  to
localised competition, with important differences  in growth potential following the niche  in
which the operate.  The diffuse competition  for resources  offers greater growth potential to
legitimised  firms  using modern  production  techniques  which  can  easily be stretched  into
more specialised  niches.  As  a consequence,  the  realised  niche of other firms  is  strongly
reduced  and they  are forced to  operate  in the marginal  edge  of the resource  space.  Those
firms  are often  denied access  to capital,  foreign exchange,  assistance  and import  licenses.
They  are  forced  to  operate  with  relatively  abundant  factors  and,  consequently  will
specialise  in labour  intensive production  techniques.  Within the niches the more  efficient
firms  can grow  up to a level  at  which  they start facing competition  from firms  of a larger
realised  niche  with  a distinct  technology.  The  latter  firms  have  a  competitive  advantage
over the newly growing firms in that segment of the market.  A firm's transition to a wider
niche,  i.e.  the  shift  to  a  more  conductive  resource  space,  assumes,  however,  formal
legitimation.  As  such,  with a formal  status a firm can  signal to the business environment
that  it is a serious  contractor  and  is accepting the rules  of the  modem  sector.  The formal
status can thus be expected to open up a firm's growth opportunities.It is the contention of this paper that the combination  of market selection through learning
with  diffuse  competition  and  legitimation  as  growth  moderators  may  account  for  the
observed  bi-  or  multi-modal  size  distribution  of firms  in  less  developed  countries.  In
examining the  growth  determinants  of firms  in the manufacturing  sector of Cote d'Ivoire
the proposed framework  will therefore  be tested against data on a heterogeneous  group of
firms, composed of firms of different starting size, age, formal  status, technology  and based
in different regions of the country.
5.  Data
The  empirical  analysis  uses  a  unique  data  set  covering  the  growth  of  a  representative
sample of Ivorian manufacturing  firms.  The data are obtained from a survey conducted in
1995  and  1996 in the framework of the World Bank project RPED ('Regional  Program  on
Enterprise  Development  in  Africa).  The data  base  includes  185  manufacturing  firms  for
which  historical  data  on  sales,  employment  and  other  structural  variables  are  available.
The  firms  are  active  in  one  of the four  main  industrial  sectors:  agro-industries,  textiles,
wood working and metal working.  Both formal and informal  sector firms are included.
In  line  with other  studies  (McPherson  and Liedholm,  1996;  Mead  and  Morrisson,  1996)
firms  are  defined  as  'formal'  if they  are  registered,  fulfil  all  tax  obligations  and  respect
labour  and  other regulations.  Following  this  definition,  the formal  firms  were  selected
from the  population  of firms  which  submit  records  yearly  with  the  'Banque  de Donn6es
Financieres'  (BDF).  These  firms respect  all  fiscal  obligations,  including  VAT,  company
taxes  and business  license taxes  at local  and national  level.  They have  full  access  to  all
business support services organised by state agencies.
The  group  of  informal  firms  on  the  other  hand  pay  at  most  local  business  license  tax
('patente').  Many  informal  firms  in  C6te  d'Ivoire  are  registered  merely  for  local  tax
purposes,  a  consequence  of the  government  objective  to extend the tax  base by including
the  informal sector (World Bank,  1994).  Despite this local tax contribution,  they keep the
image of being tax evadors,  as some  informal firms engaged in activities which require  no
fixed premises  still escape the tax burden and all of them escape  company and value added
taxes.  None  of the  informal  firms  have  access  to business  support services  and  training
programs.  A third  and relatively  small  group of firms defines  itself  as  semi-formal.  The
firms  don't  keep  full  records  but  nevertheless  pay  some  taxes  on  turnover.  They have
access  to  a  number  of support  services  provided  by  state  agencies,  but  are  in  size  and
technology closer to the informal sector firms.
Most industrial  activity is located  in the industrial  core  region of Abidjan.  A majority of
the sample firms  is also located there.  The second  largest industrial  region  is at the more
inward located city of Bouak6  followed by the industrial  region in the surroundings  of the
seaport  of San Pedro.  Industrial  activity is relatively  weak  and constant in the rest of the
country.
Foreign  participation  in  industry  is very important  in  C6te d'Ivoire  as  a result of former
open-door  policies  which  were  aimed  at  stimulating  foreign  investment  and  attractinglabour.  Over the period  1980-91  foreign  ownership  accounted  for  an average  of 78%  of
total  equity  of private  firms  reporting  to  the  BDF (World  Bank,  1994).  The  extensive
foreign ownership  and the large presence of foreigners  in the labour force also characterise
the sample  firms.  Firms  owned  by non-African  foreigners  are  on  average  larger.  Firms
owned  by  foreigners  from  neighbouring  West-African  countries  are  mainly  micro-
enterprises  and small firms and they are all active in the informal sector.
Table  1:  Composition  of the sample  and size  of the firms in terms of employment  in
1995
Number of  Average  size  Standard deviation
firms
All firms  185  144.4  433.3
By start-up year
1918-69  35  327.4  341.3
1970-79  45  265.7  784.8
1980-86  48  47.1  74.2
1987-95  57  18.3  21.9
By sector
Agro-industries  48  227.6  705.4
Textiles  45  153.0  424.3
Wood working  46  130.9  226.1
Metal working  46  62.8  79.1
By formal  status
Formal  125  210.4  514.7
Semi-formal  22  12.2  18.7
Info°rmal  38  3.8  4.6
6.  Empirical model
In  line  with previous  work  (Evans,  1987a)  the basic  empirical  model  follows  a  general
growth function  g in size and age:
g = St  = g(S,,A,)  (1)
S,
where St, and St are the size of a firm in period t'  and in period t respectively and At  is the
age of the firm in period t'. Following the arguments proposed  in section 4 and besides their
implicit  effects  on the shape of the  growth function,  this functional  relationship  is further
moderated  through  a  set  of  environmental  and  firm  specific  variables  X  which  are
hypothesized to interact with the basic function in the following exponential way:
G = g(S,, A,)ebX  (2)
Approximating  the growth  function  g through  a second  order logarithmic  expansion  of a
generalised function relating growth to size and age, the estimating equation corresponds  to
the following form:og(S')  - log(S)  = ao + al log(S,)  + a2 log(S)]  + a3 log(A,,)  + a4 [log(A, )]  +
n  (3)
a5 log(S,)  * log(A,  ) + Ybi Xi
where  d stands  for the number  of years  over  which  growth  is measured  and  a and b  are
coefficient vectors.
The dependent  variable  in equation  3  corresponds  to an average  annual growth  rate.  The
relationship  between  firm  growth  and  size  and  between  firm  growth  and  age  can
subsequently  be  analysed  by calculating  the  respective  partial  derivatives  (Evans,  1987a
and  1987b;  Variyam  and  Kraybill,  1992).  The  partial  derivatives  gs=(dlnG/dlnS)  and
ga=(dlnG/dlnA)  allow  to  test for  alternative  theories  of firm  growth,  including  the non-
monotonic  growth  path  suggested  by  the  integrated  approach  developed  in  section  4.
Gibrat's  law  implies  that  the  partial  derivative  gs equals  zero.  Alternatively  a negative
relationship  between  firm size  and growth  implies that g,<O.  Models  of learning  suggest
that ga<O.  The elasticity  of end-of-period  size  with respect  to beginning-of-period  size  is
ES= I  +dg5, while the elasticity of end-of-period  size with respect to age is EA=dga.
Variables
The dependent  variable is the average annual  growth rate of sales and, alternatively,  of the
firm's employment  growth  calculated  over the entire period  of existence  of the firm, from
birth to 1994.  The analysis is also performed analysing growth  over a homogenous  shorter
period, covering the years from 1989 until 1994.
Following the proposed estimating  equation,  the  set of explanatory  variables  includes  firm
size  (SIZE),  measured  alternatively  as  deflated  sales or employment,  and firm age  (AGE)
as basic  determinants  of firm  growth.  Size  is  measured  at  the  beginning  of the  period
under consideration,  start-up and 1989 respectively.  , while age is measured in 1994.
The  environmental  moderators  of the growth  relationship  include  the sector  to which  the
firm belongs and the region where it is located. Three binary variables  account for possible
different  growth  performance  in  the  textiles,  woodworking  and  metalworking  industries
(TEXTILES,  WOOD, METAL).  The  reference  sector is agro-industry.  From interviews  it
is clear that  owners  and managers  view the geographical  location  as  important  for having
access to  local resources.  The  availability  of industrial  sites and infrastructure  and access
to raw materials  and skilled labor were mentioned as the main location determinant by 80%
of the firms.  Only  8% of all  firms choose  their location  with the  intention  to be close to
clients or competitors.  The largest market and the largest supply of resources  is in Abidjan.
Firms  located  in  Abidjan  are  further  more  likely  to  engage  in  networking  and
subcontracting,  hereby exploiting additional  growth opportunities.  Three binary variables
(BOUAKE,  SAN PEDRO,  OTHER  REGIONS)  are  included  to  capture the  geographical
niche  effect  of being  located  in  Bouak6,  San  Pedro  or  other  regions  in  the  country,  as
compared  to the reference  group of firms being located in Abidjan.
In  addition  to  the  regional  impact  on  diffuse  competition,  a  firm  specific  measure  of
capital, or more precisely, non-labour resource-intensity  is included to capture the extent towhich  firms  have  access  to the entire  resource space,  including capital  and basic services
(CAPITAL INTENSITY).  Firms  which  are to some extent  deprived from these inputs are
expected to grow less. Large established firms keep the smaller labour intensive firms from
growing  further after  they have reached  a critical  size.  Above this  size other  more capital
intensive firms outperform  them as the use of capital  allows for more efficient  production.
Capital  intensity  is  measured  as  the  cost  of  electricity,  water,  fuel  and  telephone  per
employee.  In  the employment growth regression the share of the cost of electricity,  water,
fuel  and  telephone  in  total  sales  is  used  as  an  alternative  to  measure  these  costs  per
employee to minimise spurious correlation.  Capital and technology  sourcing from abroad is
taken  into  account  by making  a distinction  following  the origin  of capital:  non-Ivorian
African,  European  or  Asian  direct  investment  (AFRICAN,  EUROPEAN,  ASIAN).
Foreign  firms  in  C6te  d'Ivoire  are  indeed  found  to  import  significantly  more  than  their
domestic counterparts  (Harrisson,  1996).  A further distinction  is made for subsidiaries  of
firms,  which  have  access  to  resources  of the parent  company  and  its  network  (MULTI).
Similarly  a  binary  variable  SOE  denotes  State  Owned  Firms,  which  have  a  soft  budget
constraint  and  have  access  to  bank  loans  under  state  guarantee.  Their  status  moreover
facilitates the relationship  of SOEs with other market participants.  The legal status implies
more clear-cut juridical  consequences,  facilitating contract enforcement  and granting them
more credibility,  transparency  or legitimation in the industry.
In order to take further account of the firm's legitimation  in the industry,  a binary  variable
FORMAL  is  included.  The variable  takes  the  value one  for the formal  firms,  which  are
officially registered,  fulfil all legal and tax obligation  and takes the value zero for informal
firms,  including the so-called semi-formal  firms.
Estimation and results
The model is estimated  with a two stage  least squares  where the  fitted  values  of a probit
equation,  explaining  the probability that a firm is formally registered,  are entered  into the
growth  equation  (Barnow  et.al,  1981).  This  procedure  is  adopted  to  account  for  the
possible  bias  originating  from  endogeneity  of the  variable  FORMAL.  The  decision  to
become  formal  appears  indeed  to  be  subject  to the  same  underlying  growth  process.  In
instrumenting  the  variable  FORMAL  a binary  variable  equalling  one for exporting  firms
was  used  as  an  extra  variable.  Standard  errors  are  estimated  using White's  consistent
estimator (White,  1981). It  should also be  noted  that only surviving firms  are  included in
the data set, implying that the findings  of the empirical  analysis  are restricted to survivors.
A  recent  study  by  McPherson  (1996)  on  the  growth  of  firms  in  five  southern  African
countries  analyses the possible  selection  bias resulting from the exclusion of exiting firms
on the growth relationship  and finds this bias to be insignificant.
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients  and t-ratios for the growth  regressions.  The first
four  columns  presents  the  results  for  sales  growth.  The  last  four  columns  present  the
employment  growth  regressions  over  the  two  different  periods,  start-up  until  1994  and
from 1989 until 1994.
The relationship  between  size  and growth  is significantly  negative,  implying  that  smaller
firms  grow  faster  than  larger  ones.  The  results  are  robust  and  hold  over  the  differentperiods  and  samples  of firms  for which  growth  is  measured4. They  are  consistent  with
studies conducted in other countries.  For sales growth over the last five years the quadratic
term of size is positive  and significant at the 95%  level implying that the negative effect of
size on growth diminishes  for larger size classes. The partial derivatives of the growth rate
to  log size  evaluated  at  the  sample  mean  are  negative.  They  equal  -0.10 for  the  growth
regression  from  start-up  until  1994  and  -0.07  for  growth  over  the  period  1989-94.  The
elasticity  of end-of-period  size  with  respect  to beginning-of-period  size  is  -0.28  for  the
sales  growth  regression  over  the entire  period  and  0.67  for  the  period  1989-94,  results
which go against Gibrat's law of random growth behaviour.
In estimating the age effect,  the restriction of fixing the coefficient  of squared employment
to  zero  could  not be  rejected.  Hence,  the extra  columns  presenting  the  restricted  model
table  2.  For small firms the effect of age on growth is  negative.  However,  from  a certain
critical  size  on,  the  age  effect  becomes  positive  as  is  suggested  by  the  positive  and
significant  interaction  term  between  size  and  age.  Evaluated  at the  sample  means,  the
partial  derivative  of growth  to log age equals  0.008 for the sales growth  equation over the
period  from  start-up  until  1994  and  -0.007  over  the period  1989-94.  These  findings,  in
particular  those  relating  to  the  period  since  start-up,  suggest  that  start-up  size  has  an
important effect on the  subsequent growth performance of firms.  Firms starting  at a larger
size tend  to  grow  faster,  as  they  grow  older.  This  suggests  that, in  addition  to learning
effects, opposing processes are at work,  which favour firms that start at a large scale.  More
precisely,  the findings are  supportive  for the hypothesis  that a dynamic  process  of diffuse
competition  and legitimation  in the industry  is putting firms under  different regimes,  with
larger firms facing better growth  opportunities as  they become better legitimised over time
and get access to more resources.
Corroborating  these findings,  capital intensive firms,  i.e.  firms with more intensive  use of
electricity, fuel,  water and telephone,  can grow significantly  faster.  Although  small labour
intensive  firms realise strong growth rates in the beginning  stages of their growth path, the
growth  smoothens  very  rapidly  towards  stagnating  levels  as  the  labour  intensive  firms
reach the critical size  at which economies  of scale  are fully exploited.  Firms that are  able
to apply a more capital intensive  technology  and use related  services more intensively can
reap additional scale economies and grow further into a larger size.
4  Historical  sales  and  employment  data  were  not consistently  available  for  all  firms.  In  order  to  use  the
maximum  information  available  from  the  data  set  the  size  of  the  sample  may  therefore  differ  across
estimating models.  Running the different  models on different subsamples and  on the reduced  sample of firms
for which all information  about employment and sales growth was consistently  available,  did not produce any
different results.Table 2.:  Re  r  results for sales  anet  r  te  rdn  1  -94
Sales growth  Employment  growth
start-94  start-94  1989-1994  1989-1994  start-1994  start-94  1989-1994  1989-1994
AGE  0.007  -1.114*  0.006  -0.113**  -0.261**  -0.164***  -0.198  -0.151
(0.076)  (-1.745)  (0.088)  (-2.127)  (-1.988)  (-3.322)  (-1.644)  (-3.137)
AGE
2 -0.038 **  - -0.040  ***  - 0.030  - 0.017  -
(-2.010)  (-2.717)  (0.969)  (0.552)
SIZE  -0.203  ***  -0.205  ***  -0.228  ***  -0.214 ***  -0.250 ***  -0.260 ***  -0.204 ***  -0.217
(-4.195)  (-4.214)  (-5.740)  (-5.160)  (-3.437)  (-3.917)  (-2.792)  (-3.662)
SIZE
2 0.002  0.003  0.006 **  0.007  **  0.011  0.010  0.011 *  0.010
(0.579)  (0.656)  (2.012)  (2.344)  (1.567)  (1.428)  (1.944)  (1.670)
AGE*SIZE  0.039 ***  0.036  ***  0.036 ***  0.025  **  0.038 *  0.046 ***  0.025  0.033
(2.977)  (2.666)  (3.510)  (2.504)  (1.958)  (2.871)  (1.391)  (3.367)
CAPITAL INTENSITY  0.021  ***  0.022  ***  0.023 ***  0.022  ***  0.232 ***  0.246  ***  0.190 **  0.203
(2.687)  (2.771)  (2.834)  (2.633)  (2.638)  (2.922)  (2.184)  (2.565)
FORMAL  0.384***  0.416  ***  0.545 ***  0.546  ***  0.512 ***  0.496***  0.405***  0.408***
(2.666)  (2.812)  (4.426)  (4.197)  (3.302)  (3.251)  (2.984)  (2.974)
SAN PEDRO  -0.266 *  -0.267 ***  -0.107  -0.105  -0.113  -0.115  -0.001  -0.004
(-2.717)  (-3.342)  (-0.867)  (-0.882)  (-1.447)  (-1.367)  (-0.017)  (-0.048)
BOUAKE  -0.169 **  -0.174 **  -0.183 *  -0.182  ***  -0.175  **  -0.165 *  -0.185  ***  -0.188
(-2.005)  (-2.037)  (-3.006)  (-2.882)  (-2.022)  (-1.850)  (-3.014)  (-2.975)
OTHER  REGIONS  -0.124  -0.155 *  -0.237  ***  -0.240 ***  -0.131  **  -0.117  -0.125 **  -0.129 **
(-1.292)  (-1.899)  (-3.756)  (-4.249)  (-1.974)  (-1.610)  (-2.388)  (-2.387)
AFRICAN  0.053  0.013  0.103  0.067  0.081  0.098  0.152 *  0.162
(0.686)  (0.165)  (1.141)  (0.764)  (1.114)  (1.196)  (1.871)  (1.742)
EUROPEAN  -0.001  -0.043  0.044  0.021  -0.050  -0.020  0.003  0.011
(-0.012)  (-0.662)  (0.784)  (0.365)  (-0.705)  (-0.328)  (0.063)  (0.217)
ASIAN  0.001  -0.024  0.024  0.020  -0.150 *  -0.137  -0.083  -0.081
(0.000)  (-0.287)  (0.318)  (0.266)  (-1.686)  (-1.607)  (-1.393)  (-1.359)
SOE  0.142  0.088  0.168  0.147  -0.082  -0.064  -0.061  -0.058
(1.047)  (0.624)  (1.208)  (1.054)  (-0.398)  (-0.326)  (-0.758)  (-0.722)
MULTI  0.029  0.025  -0.082  -0.075  0.033  0.038  0.026  0.023
(0.427)  (0.337)  (-1.211)  (-1.065)  (0.902)  (0.996)  (0.688)  (0.653)
TEXTILES  0.013  -0.012  -0.051  -0.070  0.172 **  0.178 **  0.096  0.099
(0.128)  (-0.121)  (-0.745)  (-0.978)  (2.127)  (2.051)  (1.494)  (1.450)
WOOD  0.117  0.138 *  0.059  0.074  0.080  0.062  0.023  0.016
(1.524)  (1.768)  (1.000)  (1.208)  (1.349)  (1.065)  (0.497)  (0.329)
METAL  0.111  0.090  -0.002  -0.014  0.035  0.043  0.050  0.053
(1.354)  (1.075)  (-0.049)  (-0.267)  (0.755)  (0.984)  (1.342)  (1.465)
Constant  0.370  0.453 **  0.326 *  0.382 **  0.377 **  0.320 **  0.334 **  0.312
(1.584)  (2.006)  (1.754)  (1.981)  (2.444)  (2.332)  (2.476)  (2.468)
N  66  66  107  107  107  107  129  129
R-Adj.  0.4284  0.4208  0.3800  0.3579  0.3579  0.3545  0.4007  0.4014
F-statistic  3.707  3.778  4.609  4.476  4.282  4.424  5.755  6.048
Asymptotic  t-ratios are in parentheses;  Significance  levels:  *** 99%; ** 95%; * 90%.In  general,  the  hypothesis  that  the  growth  is  strongly  moderated  through  different
environmental  and  institutional  conditions  is  strongly  supported  by  the  data.  The
coefficient  of the variable formal  is positive  and significant at the 99%  level. The formal
character  of a firm increases  its estimated  annual  growth  rate over the entire  period since
start-up by 0.38.  For the period  1989-1994 the formal status increases the expected annual
growth  rate with 0.55.  The results  suggest that besides competition,  the process  of formal
legitimation  is  important.  Formal  firms  tend  to  grow  faster  as  scarce  resources  are
allocated to  established firms which  have  legitimated themselves  in markets  characterised
by high transaction costs.
Also the geographical  niche  seems  to have  an  impact  on the  development  of firms.  The
location variables  all have a negative coefficient indicating that the better  supplied Abidjan
region  is  more  conductive  to  firm  development  than  the  geographical  niches of Bouak6,
San  Pedro  and  other  locations.  External  scale  economies  and  urbanisation  economies
relaxing  diffuse competition  for resources  seem to account  for these differences  in growth
performances.
The  presumed  effects  of foreign  ownership,  offering  firms  the  opportunity  of  sourcing
abroad,  are not significant.  State owned firms (SOE) tend to expand sales faster.  However,
the  estimated  standard  error  is  large.  This  also  applies  to  firms  belonging  to  a  larger
holding group  (MULTI).  Sectoral  effects  also do not seem to produce clear  variations  in
the growth performance  of firms.
The estimation of the employment growth equation produces  results very comparable  to the
sales growth results.  The negative  age-growth and size-growth relationship  seems robust.
The interaction  term is again  positive  and significant.  Evaluated  at the sample means, the
partial  derivatives  of growth  to log size and log  age are all  negative  equalling  -0.11  and -
0.03  respectively  for the entire period  since start-up  and -0.07  and -0.03  for the five year
growth  period.  Again,  for  firms  which start  at  a large  scale,  i.e.  about  30 employees  or
more,  the age  effects  turns  positive.  Firms located  in Abidjan  expand  employment  at  a
higher average growth rate.  The difference  with firms located in Bouake and other regions
remains  significant.  Formal  firm and capital  intensive  firms  grow  significantly  faster by
0.51  and 0.41  percent respectively.  Except for the textiles  sector,  sectoral  effects again do
not seem to matter much.
The  empirical  results  suggest  a  strong  difference  in  the  growth  performance  for  firms
which  start  at a small  scale  and  use  labour  intensive  technologies.  If resource  markets,
including primarily  capital  markets,  were to  operate  without  imperfections,  the  transition
towards  a  more  capital  intensive  technology  would  be  a  continuous  process.  However,
serious  asymmetries  in  information  operate  in  favour  of  the  larger  established  firms
benefiting  from  reputation  effects  and  work  against  the  smaller  firms  with  a  labour
intensive technology.  As a consequence  firms in the middle of the size distribution may be
assumed  to  face  the  most  severe  obstacles  to  growth.  The  following  section  aims  at
uncovering more of these growth barriers  through analysing  the obstacles to growth as they
are perceived by the owners and managers of the firms.7.  Obstacles  to growth: the owner's and manager's perceptions
In  the RPED  survey the interviewed  person,  manager  or owner of the  firm,  was  asked to
quantify  a list of 17  factors  on the  degree  to which they actually  constitute  an  obstacle to
the growth of their firm.  The answers  to the question were the respondents'  subjective  and
personal  view.  The questions  were intended  to know the sources of obstacles to growth at
the moment the interview took place in  1995 and these are not necessarily  identical to past
growth hindrances.  Nevertheless,  it may be assumed  that the main constraints  to growth
are not too variable over time.  The analysis  of the manager's perception  complements  the
findings  of the previous  section  and contributes  to  a  better understanding  of how certain
types of growth obstacles are related to firm characteristics.
Table  A. 1  in  appendix  shows  the  list  of  growth  hampering  factors.  The  respondents
quantified the severeness of these factors on a numeric scale ranging from  1 to 5, where  1 =
no obstacle  and 5  = severe  obstacle.  The average  response value and standard deviation  is
shown in the table.  It can be seen that a lack of credit is perceived as the most constraining
factor, followed by taxes and lack of demand and business support services.  The  17 factors
are regrouped  and clustered into four compound variables  reflecting four different types of
obstacles:
Regulation on:  social capital, activities and location, labor regulations, price and foreign
exchange  controls,  taxes,  problems  obtaining  licenses  and  investment  benefits  and
corruption.
Market conditions: lack of demand and competition of imports.
Infrastructure: lack  of infrastructure  and business  support  services  and  the  prices  of
public utilities.
Credit: lack of credit.
Each compound variable corresponds  to the average of the composing variables and ranges
from one  to five.  In  order to uncover  systematic  effects,  a two-way censored  tobit model
relates the height of the growth obstacle to the following vector of explanatory  variables:
four  binary  variables  classifying  firms  in  four  different  size classes:  MICRO  (1-4),
SMALL  (5-49),  MEDIUM  (50-99),  LARGE  (100-249).  The reference  group  are  very
large firms (over 250 employees).
the age of the firm in  1995 (FIRM AGE).
three sectoral variables  (TEXTILES, WOOD, METAL), the reference  group being firms
active in agro-industries.
a binary variable equal to one for exporting firms (EXPORTING).
three locational  variables  (BOUAKE,  SAN PEDRO, OTHER  REGIONS), the reference
group being firms located in Abidjan.
three  binary  variables  related  to  the  origin  of  the  equity  capital  (EUROPEAN,
AFRICAN,  ASIAN).  They equal one if the majority equity capital  (>50%)  is owned by
foreign  Africans,  Europeans  or  Asians  respectively.  The  reference  group  are  firms
which are for 50% or more Ivorian owned.
a  binary  variable  (INFORMAL)  for  firms  operating  in  the  informal  and  semi-formal
sector.
The estimation results are shown in table 3.Table 3.  Tobit estimates of perceived obstacles  to growth
Dep. Var:  Regulations  Market conditions  Infrastructure  Financial
constraints
constant  1.466 ***  1.911  ***  0.994 **  0.569
(53.965)  (15.932)  (4.791)  (0.090)
D-MICRO  -0.085  -0.580  0.403  2.553
(0.150)  (1.228)  (0.675)  (1.588)
D-SMALL  0.017  -0.437  0.660 *  2.808 *
(0.012)  (1.285)  (3.201)  (3.241)
D-MEDIUM  0.176  -0.496  0.825 **  3.956 **
(1.070)  (1.451)  (4.523)  (5.673)
D-LARGE  0.171  -0.042  0.309  2.825  *
(0.961)  (0.010)  (0.579)  (2.831)
FIRM AGE  0.002  0.011  0.007  0.031
(0.283)  (1.292)  (0.565)  (0.637)
INFORMAL  -0.315 *  -0.017  -0.449  -1.037
(3.703)  (0.002)  (1.628)  (0.484)
SAN PEDRO  0.126  -0.928  1.163 **  -2.164
(0.287)  (1.480)  (5.434)  (0.961)
BOUAKE  -0.233  -0.402  -0.632  -2.706
(1.671)  (0.862)  (2.292)  (2.418)
OTHER  -0.502 *  -0.740  -0.044  2.444
REGIONS  (3.456)  (1.292)  (0.007)  (0.933)
AFRICAN  0.106  0.335  0.229  1.195
(0.509)  (0.857)  (0.508)  (0.778)
EUROPEAN  0.003  0.226  -0.221  -1.640
(0.001)  (0.595)  (0.070)  (2.127)
ASIAN  -0.072  0.452  -0.064  -1.951
(0.195)  (1.345)  (0.032)  (1.633)
TEXTILES  -0.030  -0.091  0.191  -0.590
(0.047)  (0.080)  (0.408)  (0.221)
WOOD  -0.090  -1.059  ***  0.049  -0.784
(0.402)  (8.911)  (0.025)  (0.368)
METAL  -0.197  -0.582 *  -0.426  -0.788
(2.497)  (3.808)  (2.350)  (0.477)
EXPORTING  -0.069  -0.266  -0.114  -0.280
(0.423)  (1.079)  (0.230)  (0.080)
Sigma  0.519  ***  1.201  ***  1.108  ***  4.392
(214.318)  (158.566)  (167.040)  (74.732)
N  179  179  179  179
Log likelihood  -143.1  -213.1  -214.5  -216.6
X2 -ratios are in parentheses;  Significance  levels:  99%; ** 95%; * 90%.
As  could  be  expected,  formal  firms  are  more  subject  to  regulatory  constraints  than
semiformal  and  informal  firm.  Regulation  is  less  an obstacle  to  growth  for  firms  in the
metal working sector and for firms located outside the industrial core regions.
The  perception  of market  conditions  as  an obstacle  to  growth  is  related  to the  sector  of
activity.  Firms  in  woodworking  and  in metal  working  report  significantly  less  a lack of
demand or intense competition from imports as an obstacle to growth.
The perception  of infrastructure  and supporting  services as a constraint to growth  is related
to size,  sector  and  location.  Corroborating  the  findings  of the  growth  model and  implied
diffuse  competition,  medium  sized  firms  followed  by small  firms  consider infrastructureand related services  more than  any  other group  as  a growth  obstacle.  For the largest size
class  (250+)  infrastructure  is least a problem,  probably  because  these firms  have  reached
the  critical  size to  develop  their  own  substitute  services  whenever  infrastructure  proves
unsatisfactory.  It also appears that the largest firms enjoy a priority status with government
officials when it comes to the provision and distribution  of  well functioning infrastructure
and  utilities.  Firms  in  the  metal  working  sector  experience  less  hindrance  from
infrastructure.  The opposite holds for firms  in San Pedro.
A lack of credit seems  again least constraining to the largest firms  (250+) while,  similar to
infrastructure,  most constraining  to medium  sized  firms.  Small and  large  firms  are  in  a
similar  way affected  by the  credit constraint  which  these firms  experience  as  significantly
more  severe  than  do very  large  firms.  Foreign  African  firms  experience  credit  as  more
growth  constraining  than  do  their local  counterparts.  Asian  and  European  firms  on  the
other hand feel less constrained by credit than the local Ivorian firms.
In  sum,  the  results  with  respect  to  the  perceived  obstacles  to  growth  provide  interesting
corroborating  evidence  for  the  theoretical  framework  and  empirical  growth  model
presented  in  this  paper.  The  constraining  factors  with  respect  to  infrastructure  and
supporting  services  and  the  lack  of credit  are  at  the  heart  of the  underlying  asymmetric
growth processes observed for the different groups of firms in developing countries.
8.  Conclusion
This paper presents empirical  support  for the proposition that the bimodal  size structure  of
manufacturing firms, observed  in many African countries  is the result of a complex process
in which  institutional  and  structural  factors  interact  with  dynamic  learning  processes  of
firms.  The model formalizing these processes  is tested against data on manufacturing firms
in Cote  d'Ivoire.  The  observed negative  relationship  between  a firm's  growth  and  its  age
and  size  is  consistent  with  efficiency  maximisation  through  learning  which  effects  are
stronger  for younger firms,  and through  scale  enlargements  which effects  diminish  as  the
firms  expands.  Interestingly,  firms  which  start  at  a large  scale  appear  to benefit  from  a
different  regime  with  a  stronger  growth performance  as  they  grow  older,  suggesting  that
other  mechanisms  are  at  work.  In  line  with  the  theoretical  reasoning  developed  in  this
paper,  the difference in regime is consistent with the mechanism of diffuse competion  and
legitimation,  dynamic processes emphasized in organizational  ecology models.
Under  the  process  of diffuse  competition,  firms  compete  heavily  for  scarce  resources.
Resources  are  not primarily  allocated  to  the  most  efficient  firms,  as  one  can  normally
expect from a process of intense competition in well-functioning  markets, but especially  to
those firms who are legitimated in the industry.  The process of legitimation is important in
the African context as  transaction and information costs are very high in poorly developed
markets  with  relatively  few  market  participants  and  little  transparency  as  to  a  firms'
activities,  performance  and  strengths.  A  firm  can  further  legitimate  its  existence  by
acquiring  the formal  status through  officially  registering  itself.  In  spite  of the tax  burden
and the many  regulatory  constraints  formal  firms are  subject  to, the formal  status  gives a
firm  the  opportunity  to  advertise  itself  and  develop  a  solid  reputation  in  the  businessenvironment.  The  record  keeping  obligations  which  are  imposed  to  the  formal  firms
decrease the transaction and information costs which  are to be overcome  when dealing with
any firm.  As such, contracting  for resources  and growth is facilitated  by the formal status
of the firms.
Driven by the process of diffuse competition  firms also tend to specialise in certain  market
niches.  Some  80%  of all  sample  firms  choose their  location  in  function  of access  land,
infrastructure,  skilled  labour  and  raw  materials.  This  indicates  that  some  resources  are
actually location  related  and supports the choice  of geographical  niche boundaries  for the
analysis of firm growth.  The residence of a firm in a geographical niche is indeed found to
determine a firm's growth performance.  Firms in the industrial core region of Abidjan  tend
grow faster than firms located in the rest of the country.
Alternatively the firms reside in niches determined by their size and production technology.
Firms  which  are  denied  access  to  capital  and  infrastructure  are  forced  to  specialise  in
labour intensive  production  procedures.  These  techniques  hardly  generate  economies  of
scale.  Smaller  labour intensive  firms thus enter,  after  a period  of fast growth,  a phase  of
stagnation  in terms of employment  growth.  Replication  and splitting up of the firm often
occurs in  this case.  Firms with  access to  the entire resource  space and  a capital intensive
production technique  are  able to exploit  existing  economies  of scale  and to grow  into  an
even larger size.
The combination  of these forces  imply that firms  which start  at  a small  scale  are  quickly
confronted with major growth obstacles.  The findings from the empirical growth  model are
corroborated  with  results  from  a  survey  on  growth  obstacles  as  they  are  perceived  by
managers  and owners of firms.  Managers  of medium sized firms experience the regulatory
environment  as  constraining,  and  complain  significantly  more  about  infrastructure  and
credit constraints than do manager of the largest firms.
In uncovering  the asymmetric  growth processes for different  groups of firms in developing
countries,  the paper  invites  further  analysis  with  respect  to  those  factors  which  can  help
firms  to transition  to  better  performing  groups.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  such  an
analysis will prove to be very useful for policy makers who may use these insights to make
aid and other development instruments more effective and efficient in the future.References
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12885-IVC, Washington, D.C., 96p.Table A.2.1.:  Obstacles to growth,the perption of the owners or managers
Obstacle:  mean *  std.
1. Lack of credit  2.67  1.68
2. Taxes  2.45  1.49
3. Lack of demand  2.16  1.48
4. Lack of business support services  2.15  1.45
5. Problems  obtaining investment benefits  1.83  1.40
6. Corruption  1.82  1.42
7. Price public services  1.56  0.94
8. Competition  of illegal imports  1.62  1.27
9. Lack of infrastructure  1.35  0.94
10. Competition of legal imports  1.32  0.98
11. Regulations  on activities  1.32  0.90
12. Labor regulations  1.28  0.72
13. Price controls  1.13  0.57
14. Problems obtaining licenses  1.13  0.62
15. Regulation  on equity capital  1.11  0.63
16. Regulation  on location  1.11  0.58
17. Foreign exchange  controls  1.04  0.27
Compound  variables:
Credit  2.67  1.68
Infrastructure  1.69  0.76
Market conditions  1.70  0.81
Regulation  1.42  0.42
N=179
* Mean values  can range from 1 (no obstacle)  to 5 (severe  obstacle).